Defense spending and economic growth: Extended empirical analysis for the European Union

Previous empirical studies on the defense spending-economic growth nexus such as Kollias et al. (2007 Kollias, C., N. Mylonidis, and S. Paleologou. 2007. “A panel data analysis of the nexus between defense spending and growth in the European Union.” Defense and Peace Economics 18 (1): 75–85.[Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), Mylonidis (2008 Mylonidis, N. 2008. “Revisiting the nexus between military spending and growth in the European Union.” Defense and Peace Economics 19 (4): 265–272.[Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), Dunne and Nikolaidou (2012 Dunne, J. P., and E. Nikolaidou. 2012. “Defense spending and economic growth in the EU15.” Defense and Peace Economics 23 (6): 537–548.[Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) analyzed this relationship in the case of the EU15. This study extends the analysis with the inclusion of more EU members and investigates the long run causal ordering between the two variables. Findings reported herein are not uniformed across all EU members. It is also found that end of Cold War has significant negative impact on defense expenditures of former east-European countries.     

Why nations fail: defense spending,fighting commitment and,inter-nations-prosperity-poverty-gap

Both the increasing defense spending and the widening divergence between rich and poor countries are of great concerns. This paper attempts to explain the two concepts in a unify theory framework. In the view of conflict economics, a nation’s defense spending can be seen as the fighting commitment of distributive effort in the global economy while other is the productive effort. The development of global economy needs the productive efforts from almost every nation, and the distribution of the aggregate output is determined in large degree by the fighting commitment of each nation. The numerical simulation of the model gives a reasonable explanation of the patterns of the divergence/convergence of prosperity-poverty gap between nations, the fact which is evidenced by many empirical analyses. (1) Given the initial wealth ratio between nations fixed, there is a critical value of fighting decisiveness, when the actual value is larger than the critical value, it is more likely to result in Matthew effect; otherwise the gap would gradually be shortened. (2) Given the fighting decisiveness fixed, there is a critical value of initial wealth ratio, when the actual value is larger than the critical value, it is more likely to result in Matthew effect; otherwise, the gap would gradually be shortened. The study gives a new perspective to explain and handle the increasingly defense spending and the prosperity-poverty gap between nations.     

POWER,INFLUENCE, AND HIERARCHY: DEFENSE INDUSTRIES IN A UNIPOLAR WORLD

The global defense‐industrial sector reflects the hierarchy of power in the post‐Cold War world. As in the larger international system, the United States plays the dominant role in the defense sector as well. It is a comparative advantage often used by US policymakers to influence the foreign policy behavior of other states. Curiously, the radical concentration of the world’s defense industrial sector, as described here, has received relatively little scrutiny from either academia or the media, even though it not only reflects the international order but provides the United States with considerable leverage in it.     

Resourcing for defense: Solving the roles and missions puzzle

One of the most important issues facing the post‐Cold War U.S. defense establishment concerns the future allocation of combat tasks and responsibilities among different branches of the armed forces. The challenge is to reduce unnecessary redundancy across roles and missions when resources are highly constrained, without compromising military effectiveness. Defining the policy problem as one of resource allocation rather than operational effectiveness, we develop a methodology for allocating roles and missions. Our methodology focuses at the highest level of force aggregation and uses a mathematical programming model to produce cross‐service cross‐mission trade‐offs that will yield the best total force combat and non‐combat potential within resource consumption constraints.     

Preserving defense technologies: A strategy for economic conversion†

This paper presents a model for converting legacy defense production facilities into private‐sector economic resources. Specifically, this paper will examine as a case study the first successful conversion of a former U.S. Department of Energy nuclear weapons production installation, including reasons for its success, its costs and benefits, and lessons for public policy. It is envisioned that this model may be useful for mitigating local economic hardship resulting from defense “downsizing” and for privatizing production capacities critical for national defense.     

Public opinion: A powerful predictor of U.S. defense spending

Public opinion survey responses regarding the desirability of changes in defense spending can be compressed into a single variable, the public opinion balance, which, when accompanied by a control variable measuring the proportion of responses in the “residuum” (no opinion or keep the status quo), permits an accurate prediction of subsequent changes in the rate of change of U.S. defense outlays from the mid‐1960s through the 1980s. This finding cannot be interpreted as a simple case of “the public got what it wanted,” however, because public opinion was not autonomous or spontaneous, and defense decision makers themselves played a central role in shaping public opinion.     

U.S. SPACE WEAPONS

Under the administration of President George W. Bush, Pentagon rhetoric has increasingly articulated a more robust vision of space as a future battlefield. This analysis details some of the ongoing spending for research and development programs identified in current U.S. Air Force, Missile Defense Agency (MDA), and Defense Advanced Research and Planning Agency (DARPA) planning and budget documents related to “space control” and “space force projection.” This analysis finds that current support for “space superiority” and “space control” systems remains largely rhetorical—with little actual budgetary support. Unclassified technology development programs included in the six-year Future Years Defense Plan are a decade or more away from deployment. Programs related to offensive counterspace, space-based missile defense interceptors, and space-based strike total slightly less than $300 million in FY 2006 funding. We conclude significantly higher expenditures in research and development would be required to develop and deploy killer micro satellites, space-based missile defense interceptors, and military space planes.     

U.S.–RUSSIAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION AND THE CTBT

Post-Cold War “lab-to-lab” collaborations on unclassified scientific issues between U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons laboratories set the stage for bilateral cooperation in materials control and other nuclear areas. They also became the major element in a cooperative process initiated by a Presidential Decision Directive to ensure Russia's compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. These collaborations have always been highly favored by leaders of the Russian nuclear weapons complex—the same leaders who oversee Russia's participation in various government-to-government programs. This article reviews these collaborations and examines the possibility that U.S. rebuffs of Russian proposals and the U.S. failure to keep promises of expanded collaboration could contribute to Russia's reluctance in major programs and even lead to a return to nuclear testing by Russia. The author argues that a renewed U.S. commitment to the process should be an immediate goal of the Obama administration and is an essential step in re-engaging Russia to solve the nuclear problems remaining from the Cold War. Steps for doing so are recommended.     

Rhetoric versus reality: Canadian defence planning in a time of austerity

As Canada's military mission in Afghanistan winds down and the country faces several years of fiscal austerity, all of Canada's major political parties are agreed that Canadian defence budgets must stay level or be cut. This comes at a time when the defence department is slated to replace the Canadian Forces’ (CF) major equipment fleets. Canada's defence establishment thus faces some critical decisions. One option is to try to maintain its expeditionary capabilities across all three services: army, navy and air force. Absent substantial new infusions of funds, however, this approach is likely to lead to an overall and largely chaotic reduction of capabilities. Another option is to make some difficult choices as to which expeditionary capabilities to maintain as part of a strategic review of Canada's future military needs. Such an option would ensure that Canada has at least some military capacities which can reliably be devoted to the most demanding international operations, while maintaining those capabilities required for domestic duties and North American defence. Pursuing this option would accord with the new North Atlantic Treaty Organization Strategic Concept and the call for “Smart Defense” within the Alliance. This article assesses the arguments for and against the option of specialising Canada's future defence capabilities and explores scenarios as to what a future CF may look like.     

基于POPS和PSR的美军里程碑节点审查方法

里程碑节点审查是美军装备采办过程中的核心控制手段。选取美军在该领域应用的最具代表性的项目成功可能性评审方法(Probability of Program Success,POPS)和项目支持评审方法(Program Support Review,PSR),围绕任务目标归纳出方法的主要思路,从程序步骤、评审内容框架等方面深入探究方法的特点,并从应用条件、使用范围、优点和局限性等方面进行对比分析,最后提出启示建议,为优化我军节点审查方法、提升装备采购过程管控能力提供借鉴和参考。